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CASE COMMENTARY
SHAW V. GARRISON: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW
William H. Theis*
Although the bundle of statutes loosely tied together with
the phrase "Federal Civil Rights Acts" attempts to resolve a
great variety of problems, gaps appear that must be filled by
the courts. Shaw v. Garrison' presents a novel situation high-
lighting the difficulties of filling those statutory gaps. Plain-
tiff instituted suit in a federal district court in Louisiana for
damages against a state district attorney as well as private
citizens who, he asserted, conspired to deprive him of his civil
rights. He claimed that bad faith prosecutions on various
criminal charges, instituted and conducted by the district
attorney and encouraged by the private citizens, gave rise to
claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,2 1985, 3 and 1986.4 Years after
he had filed his claims and months before he was scheduled to
present them to the jury, plaintiff died, leaving no surviving
parents, wife, children, or siblings. His executor moved to be
substituted as the plaintiff, and the defendants moved to
dismiss on the grounds of abatement.5
The district court began its analysis with consideration of
42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred
on the district courts by the provisions of this Title, and of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 391 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. La. 1975).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970): "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1970). Plaintiff had previously been granted a perma-
nent federal injunction against further criminal prosecution on the latest set
of state charges instituted against him. Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390
(E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1972).
5. Defendants also successfully moved for dismissal of claims predicated
on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986 (1970). That phase of the court's opinion will not be
treated in this commentary.
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Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES," for the
protection of all persons in the United States in their civil
rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and
enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States,
so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into
effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the
object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to fur-
nish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law,
the common law, as modified and changed by the con-
stitution and statutes of the State wherein the court hav-
ing jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so
far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and
govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the
cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of
punishment on the party found guilty.
Relying on legislative history that indicated a strong concern
for the protection of civil rights, the court discerned a "de-
ficiency" in federal law to the extent that it did not provide
for survival of the section 1983 action. It acknowledged the
possibility of survival, even though federal statutes are silent
on this issue. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit's earlier holding in
Brazier v. Cherry6 mandated resort to state law in this case.
Resort to state law, however, would have posed problems
for the plaintiff. Louisiana law, which the court felt obliged to
interpret as accurately and as sympathetically for section
1988 purposes as it would in a diversity case,7 would not allow
survival. Although a Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provi-
sion might support an unqualified substitution by the ex-
ecutor,8 Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, 9 as interpreted
6. 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961), noted in 24 GA. B.J. 414 (1962); 14 STAN. L.
REV. 386 (1962); 40 TEX. L. REV. 1050 (1962); 15 VAND. L. REV. 623 (1962); 47
VA. L. REV. 1241 (1961).
7. 391 F. Supp. at 1363.
8. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 428.
9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315: "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.
The right to recover damages to property caused by an offense or quasi
offense is a property right which, on the death of the obligee, is inherited by
his legal, instituted, or irregular heirs, subject to the community rights of the
surviving spouse.
The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or quasi
offense, if the injured person dies, shall survive for a period of one year from
the death of the deceased in favor of: (1) the surviving spouse and child or
children of the deceased, or either such spouse or such child or children; (2)
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by the state judiciary, 0 restricts survival actions to certain
enumerated surviving beneficiaries. Shaw had no statutory
survivors, an executor being a proper survivor only to actions
for property damage. The court found the characterization of
damages as injury to property more artful than apt in this
case.
Nevertheless, the court approved substitution of the
executor, finding a qualification in the command of section
1988 to apply state law: the state law must not be "inconsis-
tent with the Constitution and laws of the United States .... ,"
Abatement of a civil rights case already filed,'1 2 it held, would
be inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes of the Con-
gress that enacted section 1983. If the adequate protection of
civil rights requires survival actions for their deprivation,
state law may help accomplish that end. However, if state law
is inadequate for the task, then federal common law, in
conflict with state statute, must be pressed into service.
Shaw, then, raises difficult and important questions about
the proper interpretation of section 1988 and its interplay
with federal common law. The legislative history sheds dim
light on the statute's meaning. Introduced as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,13 the provision later codified in section
1988 provided for original civil jurisdiction and exclusive
the surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them, if he left
no spouse or child surviving; and (3) the surviving brothers and sisters of the
deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving. The
survivors in whose favor this right of action survives may also recover the
damages which they sustained through the wrongful death of the deceased.
A right to recover damages under the provisions of this paragraph is a
property right which, on the death of the survivor in whose favor the right of
action survived, is inherited by his legal, instituted, or irregular heirs,
whether suit has been instituted thereon by the survivor or not.
As used in this article, the words 'child,' 'brother,' 'sister,' 'father,' and
'mother,' include a child, brother, sister, father, and mother, by adoption,
respectively. (Amended by Acts 1948, No. 333, § 1; Acts 1960, No. 30, § 1)."
10. The court relied on J. Wilton Jones Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 248
So. 2d 878 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 259 La. 61, 249 So. 2d 202
(1971), which the court found (391 F. Supp. at 1363) to have been "cited with
apparent approval" in Austrum v. City of Baton Rouge, 282 So. 2d 434, 439
(La. 1973). But see generally King v. Cancienne, 316 So. 2d 366, 368 (La. 1975).
11. 391 F. Supp. at 1358-59 (court's emphasis).
12. The court emphasized that it was dealing with a case in which suit
had been instituted before death. Id. at 1361. Presumably, for reasons not
explicitly set forth, had Shaw not filed during his life, his executor might
have been barred, even though the latter filed a timely petition.
13. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 STAT. 27. This section was reenacted
in Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 STAT. 144.
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criminal jurisdiction of offenses under the 1866 Act; it also
established removal jurisdiction of civil and criminal cases
from state courts when the defendant was denied or could not
enforce rights secured by the 1866 Act. This provision received
virtually no attention in the legislative debates, which con-
cerned themselves with the bill's more controversial features.
Senator Trumbull's initial presentation of the bill merely
stated, without comment, the terms of the provision. 14 Rep-
resentative Thayer of Pennsylvania objected that the bill
conferred "upon the courts the power of judicial legislation
.... [T]he Federal Courts may ... make such rules and apply
such law as they please, and call it common law.' 5 President
Johnson's veto message (his veto was quickly overridden)
criticized, besides other features of the bill, the application of
federal penal laws in criminal cases removed from state
courts.' 6
Thayer's criticism of the provision certainly missed the
mark. In the Swift v. Tyson17 era, federal courts regularly
applied general common law in the resolution of diversity
cases, when no federal or state statute supplied a rule of law;
so to say that under the 1866 Act they would be doing the
same thing in the civil cases within the jurisdiction granted
by the Act is hardly a severe indictment. Indeed, the statute
seems to state the Swift v. Tyson rule: if no federal law (stat-
ute)'8 governed, general common law applied unless a state
constitutional or statutory provision conflicted with or mod-
ified the general common law.19 The requirement that state
provisions not be inconsistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States states the obvious; namely, the suprem-
acy clause of the Constitution would continue to play its role
in the law selection process. 20
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 21 although it repudiated Swift
v. Tyson, has been qualified to allow for the existence of
14. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1866).
15. Id. at 1271.
16. Id. at 1680. This application of the statute was also criticized in
Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 272 (1880) (Clifford, J., dissenting).
17. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
18. Justice Story's opinion clearly holds that "laws" are not the opinions
of judges. Rather, laws are statutes or "long-established" customs. Id. at
18-19.
19. See Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 85-86 n.10 (3d Cir. 1965).
20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
21. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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"federal common law" 22 in areas of special federal interest or
concern. While this process of qualification has not brought
the return of Swift v. Tyson, when federal common law is
appropriate, the search for the appropriate rule of law is less
fettered by the content of state statutory law.23 A purist
might argue that the Swift v. Tyson rule should continue to
apply in civil rights cases since the legislative will expressed
in section 1988 is clearly enough stated that the Court's pro-
nouncements in Swift and in Erie about the meaning of the
more imperfectly executed Rules of Decision Act 24 do not af-
fect the construction of the Civil Rights Act. However, Shaw
indicates that section 1988 has not fossilized Swift v. Tyson,25
and the choice of law process in civil rights cases is now quite
complicated.
Under Swift v. Tyson, the search for common law was in
no way limited to the decisional law of the state where the
federal court sat, although local law might provide insight
into the proper common law rule for the federal court to
apply.2 6 Generally, the federal courts have taken the same
approach in civil rights cases. Most especially in cases where
the proper limits of defenses are drawn into question, the
federal courts apply a common law rule in no way mandated
by the local law of the jurisdiction where the case may hap-
pen to be heard. 27 For example, a number of federal courts
have taken the position, contrary to traditional common law
principles recognized in most states, that in police misconduct
suits the officer may defend on the ground that at the time of
the alleged deprivation, he thought reasonably and in good
faith that he was not inflicting a deprivation of constitutional
rights.28 Surprisingly enough, the courts, on this issue as well
22. This development is set out and praised in Friendly, In Praise of
Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383 (1964). See
P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 756-832 (2d ed. 1973) (exhaustive collection of
cases and commentary).
23. See notes 35-36, infra, and accompanying text.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970).
25. Indeed, one court has greatly minimized the relevance of this statute
to the questions of federal law and policy which arise in federal civil rights
cases. See Baker v. F & F Investment Co., 420 F.2d 1191, 1196 n.7 (7th Cir.
1970).
26. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.), 1, 19 (1842).
27. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 n.9 (1975).
28. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
1976]
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as on others in which they rely on federal common law, 2 9
seldom place express reliance on section 1988.
Although courts generally search for federal common law
without granting any binding effect to state decisional laws,
the Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park30 suggests that local decisional law may sometimes sup-
ply the rule of decision. In that case, plaintiff sought damages
for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Although that section does
not provide an express remedy for its breach, the Court
granted an implied remedy and remanded for further consid-
eration. In commenting on the measure of damages, the
Court said that a federal standard should apply and that
section 1988 supplied that standard:
As we read § 1988 . . . both federal and state rules on
damages may be utilized, whichever better serves the
policies expressed in the federal statutes .... [T]he rule of
damages, whether drawn from federal or state sources, is
a federal rule responsive to the need whenever a federal
right is impaired. 31
Although the Court denominates as federal the law eventu-
ally applied, it seems that the state law under this formula-
tion plays a role denied it by Swift v. Tyson. Since in most
states damages law is mostly judge-made, Sullivan clearly
contemplates an application of a state's judge-made law. If
the local rule, either alone or in conjunction with federal law,
better promotes protection of civil rights than the application
of federal law only, then the judge must apply state law,
Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972); Theis, "Good Faith" as a
Defense to Suits for Police Deprivations of Individual Rights, 59 MINN. L.
REV. 991 (1975).
29. See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 517 F.2d
1141 (4th Cir. 1975) (liability of corporate directors, a matter of federal law);
Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1975) (validity of release a matter of
federal law); Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Greer,
477 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1973) (proximate cause a matter of federal law); District
of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) (availability of negligence claim a
matter of federal law); Martin v. Duffle, 463 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1972) (burden
of proof a matter of federal law); Anderson v. Nosser, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir.
1972) (proximate cause a matter of federal law); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d
358 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970) (same
issue and holding as in Carter); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799 (1st Cir.
1968) (availability of punitive damages a matter of federal law).
30. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
31. Id. at 240.
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whether it be decisional or statutory. Presumably, on the
issue of damages in civil rights cases, more is better.32 Hence,
the judge must award damages for whatever items of recov-
ery would be allowed under the law of the state where he sits,
even though the applicable precedent might demand that the
particular items are not recoverable under the federal com-
mon law.
Besides a lack of uniformity in damage awards,3 Sulli-
van's language creates severe difficulties of reconciliation. To
what extent are more liberal state decisional rules applicable
to issues other than the award of damages? Must the federal
courts apply local decisional law whenever it enhances the
plaintiff's possibility of recovering?3 4 If that is Sullivan's
message, then the development of defenses in police miscon-
duct suits, as in the earlier example, has no practical effect in
states which adhere to a more objective standard. It is un-
likely, however, that the federal courts that have so drasti-
cally departed from traditional, prevailing principles of com-
mon law would allow their efforts to be undone so easily.
State decisional law will continue to expand the horizons of
federal common law; but it is difficult to believe that, except
in the area of damages, it will have an independent force.
The federal courts' post-Erie development of federal
common law makes unlikely the survival of the assumptions
codified in section 1988. In cases other than civil rights cases,
the trend of the decisions is to fill the gaps in federal statu-
tory schemes with federal common law or with state law,
without regard to the latter's character as statutory or deci-
sional.35 If state law, whatever its source, conflicts with over-
32. But see Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220 (D. Colo. 1966).
33. Before Sullivan, uniformity of awards was regarded as a desirable
goal. See Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1968); Basista v. Weir, 340
F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
34. A few cases have applied local decisional law to impose vicarious
liability on supervisory law enforcement personnel. See Scott v. Vandiver, 476
F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1973); McDaniel v. Carroll, 457 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1972);
Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955). Contrary to the suggestion
of McDaniel, these cases do not pose an issue of "damages." Thus, they
appear to be the only cases outside the damages area that grant state
decisional law an independent force, contrary to the command of section 1988.
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 42-46, infra, has disapproved these holdings to the extent that they
rely on any state law, statutory or decisional.
35. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973);
UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S.
1976]
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riding federal policy, although not directly with a federal
statute, then it must give way.3 6 Shaw's reading of section
1988 parallels this development found in other areas; "inhos-
pitable" state statutes may be discarded.3 7
It is this author's projection that any state statute, other
than a statute of limitations,38 which inhibits plaintiffs case
more than would federal common law will be found "inhospi-
table." Generally, state statutes have been considered only
for the beneficial effect they would have on the plaintiffs
case.3 9 If the federal policy in favor of the protection of civil
rights is a strong one, as the federal courts frequently in-
sist,40 then local concerns reflected in state statutes that
stand to bar or diminish plaintiffs chances of recovery will
likely give way.4 1 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park clearly com-
templates that all state damages rules, even those found in
statutes, must give way to federal rules, decisional as well as
statutory, that better advance federal policy.
Beyond Shaw, the United States Supreme Court's recent
decision in Moor v. County of Alameda42 raises the question
whether there are instances in which neither federal common
663 (1962); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956); Sola Elec. Co. v.
Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
36. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970)
(Florida statute ousted by federal admiralty common law); Roberson v. N.V.
Stoomvaart Maatschappij, 507 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1975).
37. Sullivan, discussed in text accompanying notes 30-37, supra, certainly
leaves open the possibility that federal common law may oust state law,
whatever its source, statutory or decisional.
38 O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1915) (civil rights act cases subject to
state statutes of limitations). The application of state statutes of limitations
is a special situation not inconsistent with prior observations. The federal
courts have always been concerned lest a federal right be of infinite duration.
See, e.g., Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1895). Since the setting
of limitations is not a task performed well by the judiciary, the adoption of
local statutes is better than no statute at all. See Note, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 68,
72 (1953). Only if the state statute discriminates against federal suits might
rejection of the state statute be proper. See Campbell v. Haverhill, supra.
39. See, e.g., Hall v. Wooten, 506 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1974); McDaniel v.
Carroll, 457 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1972); Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.
1961); Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961); Javits v. Stevens, 382
F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Perkins v. Sulafia, 338 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Conn.
1972); Galindo v. Brownell, 255 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
40. See, e.g., Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961); Shaw v.
Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. La. 1975).
41. See notes 35-36, supra, and accompanying text.
42. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
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law nor state law may be employed under section 1988. In
that case plaintiffs argued that, notwithstanding Monroe v.
Pape's43 holding on municipal liability, California statutes
providing for municipal liability allowed recovery. Although
defendant was not a "person" within the meaning of section
1983, it was liable under the California statutes, as incorpo-
rated by section 1988. The Court, in rejecting this attempt to
undermine Monroe, a decision it found firmly rooted in legis-
lative history, declared:
Properly viewed ... § 1988 instructs the federal court as
to what law to apply in causes of action arising under
federal civil rights acts. But we do not believe that the
section, without more, was meant to authorize the
wholesale importation into federal law of state causes of
action . ... Considered in context . . . § 1988 . . . was
obviously intended to do nothing more than to explain the
source of law to be applied in actions brought to enforce
the substantive provisions of the Act. .... 44
Importantly, the remarks on the role of state law make no
distinction between state statutes and decisional law.45
Moor adds a cautionary note. Although section 1988 pro-
vides the courts with two sources of law, they may not employ
those sources unless they are protecting interests found in
other "provisions of the Act." Unlike the approach under
Swift v. Tyson, the basic interests to be protected through
legal action must find their roots in federal statute apart
from section 1988.46
In the context of Shaw, the application of state survival
43. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
44. 411 U.S. at 703-05.
45. The Court criticizes in a footnote (id. at 704 n.17) two cases imposing
vicarious liability, lumping them together even though one decision rested on
state statutory law and the other on state decisional law.
46. This limitation is as stringent as the limitations found in post-Erie
federal common law. Compare United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954);
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947), with Cotton v. United
States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229 (1850). It should be noted, however, that Moor in
no way disapproves the well-known technique of implying remedies from-
federal statutes. Implying a cause of action is a device frequently used by the
Court. See P. BATOR, P. MISHIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 798-800 (2d ed. 1973). The Court may have
tightened up the availability of the device in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), 95
S. Ct. 2080 (1975).
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statutes seems to cause no problems. By definition, these
create no state cause of action; they merely allow a federal
cause of action to survive. Only the decedent's interests are
protected. However, not all state statutes can be so neatly
categorized. Some, as does Louisiana Civil Code article 2315,
include in addition to survival recovery elements of wrongful
death recovery, that is, protection of the survivors' own
interests. 47 Even in some states which ostensibly distinguish
)between survival and wrongful death recovery, survival re-
covery includes compensation for diminution of the dece-
dent's estate, which realistically seems to protect the sur-
vivors' interests.48
If section 1988 can be employed only "in actions brought
to enforce the substantive provisions of the Act,"' 49 protection
under state or federal law of the survivors' interests seems
inappropriate. Brazier, it is argued, incorrectly extended"0
recovery to protect the survivors' interests. Nothing in the
text of section 1983 sanctions the protection of their interests.
Although the survivors of a person whose life was taken as
the result of a deprivation of constitutional rights may be
"injured," "the party injured" in the text of section 1983
refers only to the victim of a deprivation of constitutional
rights. It would be a strained reading of section 1983 to say
that the "person" deprived of his rights and the "party in-
jured" were not always identical. A deprivation leading to
death would not deprive the members of the family of con-
stitutional rights belonging to themselves.5 ' Although
* Brazier had a justifiable concern lest death-either fortuitous
or intentionally inflicted-absolve a wrongdoer,52 the interest
to be protected is the vindication of the decedent's constitu-
tional rights. State law insofar as it protects the survivors'
interests may properly be considered only with respect to
whatever pendent state law claims they may wish to present.
47. Until Callais v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 56,120 (La. Sup. Ct., Nov. 4, 1975),
the Louisiana Supreme Court had held that article 2315 created one cause of
action. E.g., Reed v. Warren, 172 La. 182, 136 So. 59 (1931).
48. For a brief discussion of the various statutory schemes, see W. PROS-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 126-27 (4th ed. 1971).
49. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 705 (1973).
50. 293 F.2d at 407 & n.15.
51. But see Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974). Only section
1986 provides recognition of the survivors' interests and that is a highly
limited recognition.
52. 293 F.2d at 404 & n.9.
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The pattern resulting from Shaw and Moor is not the tidy
one that strict adherence to section 1988 might have pro-
duced. Federal common law fills in statutory gaps; it protects
only the interests given recognition by statute. State law, if
more beneficial to plaintiff, at least in the area of damages,
may oust federal common law. State statutes, except statutes
of limitations, receive no special deference; they may be
swept away. Although this untidy state of affairs is disturb-
ing, the "new" federal common law will probably proceed
without too much concern for the antique framework of sec-
tion 1988.
